The Kennedy Assassination Tapes
A Rebuttal to the Acoustical Evidence Theory
James C. Bowles




An orderly narrative detailing the events of the presidential motorcade certainly cannot be offered as proof for or against any argument. However correct the narrative is, it is basically a story; it cannot substitute for evidence. Society must always be demanding in what it accepts as evidence. Where legitimate evidence is found, it must be recognized and supported. Where evidence cannot be established to a reasonable certainty, it is the individual's responsibility to reach independent conclusions without being beguiled into another's determinations, or the conclusions are best left unresolved.

Certain points should be clarified, and certain questions answered:

* Was the "Open Mike" on Channel 1 on a motorcycle?

* Was it a two-wheeled or a three-wheeled motorcycle?

* Was it near enough to Dealey Plaza to record shots?

* Would the existing communications network have recorded an audible sound of a shot, had such a shot been fired in close enough proximity to the open mike?

* Do the projected time estimates, in the absence of factual time, correctly represent time for the needs of this undertaking?

* Can events be accurately reconstructed?

* Does accurate reconstruction enhance any hypothesis or theory as to what did happen when no proof exists?

The Committee Report acknowledges that the theory of a fourth shot, thus a second assassin, and thus the likelihood of a conspiracy rests entirely on the accurate determination of the assumptions based on a small segment of a recording, thirteen years of age. Before considering what might be found on such a tape, it should be determined whether the motorcycle was even in or near Dealey Plaza. If the open microphone was not in a position from which it could record events in Dealey Plaza, anything found on the recording is academic and irrelevant.

Consider the preceding questions:

FIRST: Was the open mike on a motorcycle?

Yes, it was. The Committee Report seems to generally agree with this. However, reference was made to a "motorcycle or other vehicle." At least two-dozen motorcycle officers with extensive motorcycle service, two-wheel and three-wheel, have listened to the recordings some several times. These officers independently agree that the recording was made through the open mike on a motorcycle. In addition, several experienced radio operators agreed to the same.

SECOND: Was it a two-wheel or three-wheel motorcycle?

It was a three-wheel motorcycle. NOTE: The Committee could have and should have used the equipment available to them to analyze the motor-sounds in the recording. They would have proved that the chart generated by a three-wheel "flat-head" engine rather than a Harley Davidson, high-performance, "over-head-74" matched the chart generated by the motorcycle in the recording. This would have conclusively eliminated McLain as the suspect operator.

THIRD: Was the motorcycle in or near Dealey Plaza?

It was not. Since the Committee chose not to analyze the motorcycle sounds, and since three-wheel units were near Dealey Plaza, it is important to consider why the motorcycle was elsewhere. FIRST: Consider that to have recorded the shots, AUDIBLY OR INAUDIBLY, the open mike would have had to be within 300 feet of the sound source. Just "in or near" Dealey Plaza will NOT suffice. The receiver must be within 300 feet of the source. The Committee declared that it was but with no proof. There are several reasons why it was not, and they should be considered.

Why the motorcade WAS NOT in Dealey Plaza:

During the 12:24 (Channel 1) time frame, the microphone "opened" for about 4 1/2 seconds. Moments later, it stuck open twice for about one second each time. Then, during the 12:28 (Channel 1) time frame, it opened for 17 seconds. Each of these times, the sound of the engine speed indicates the motorcycle was underway, traveling about 30 MPH. During the 12:22 to 12:26 period, the motorcade traveled on Harwood from Live Oak to Main Street, then turned West on Main and traveled to Field Street. That required an average speed not more than 8 1/2 MPH. Also, at 12:24, the motorcade was on Main near Ervay Street. The crowd had increased and the cheering was tumultuous. At 12:28, the motorcade was on Main near Market Street, averaging just over 4 MPH through a very heavy and loudly cheering crowd, the spectators overflowing into the street. How, then could the open mike have been on any kind of motorcycle in the motorcade when the subject motorcycle was traveling 30 MPH? With this consideration, the absence of crowd noise isn't so important, considering the suspect motorcycle was traveling some FIVE TIMES FASTER than the motorcade. It would have run off and left the motorcade long before the shots were fired.

At 12:29, the microphone again stuck open and remained open for more than five minutes. At that time, the motorcade was nearing Main and Houston Streets. In the next period of some two minutes, the motorcade would almost stop while turning right onto Houston, ease its way north to Elm Street, then turn left onto Elm, westward toward the Triple Underpass. During this segment the motorcade speed was reduced to less than 4 MPH, and one or two stops were required as well as a considerable amount of "walking-speed" travel. During this interval remember, the motorcycle with the open mike was still traveling 30 MPH.

A little past 12:30, the motorcycle in question transmitted a noticeable slowing down and an irregular running speed, continuing in that mode for almost one minute. This would embrace the period when the shots were fired. Just after 13:31, when the motorcade was departing Dealey Plaza en route to Parkland Hospital at an accelerated speed, and with numerous sirens in operation, the open microphone began transmitting the sound of its engine running at a slow idle for about half a minute. Then it revved-up slightly for about 15 seconds then it slowed down again and seemed to sit and idle. It remained in this situation until about 12:34 p.m., the time the motorcade reached Parkland Hospital.

It is impossible for the rational mind to equate this idling motorcycle engine with that of Officer McLain or any other escort motorcycle racing to the hospital. The differences in the engine sounds and speeds are so conspicuous it is easy to perceive the differences by ear. The question of speed, again, could have and should have been determined by electronic measuring techniques available to the Committee. That could have been done much quicker and at much less expense than the amazing search for the inaudible shots. Why try so hard to prove the impossible when the obvious is before you, and more readily and economically accessible?

Consideration as to the probability of McLain or any other escort officer having negligently, deliberately or accidentally been on or switching to the "wrong channel" will not be enlarged upon except to recall two principal considerations:

1) the radio traffic on Channel 2 was heard, obeyed, and recalled by the motorcade officers, and

2) it was impossible that an officer could have heard a speaker from across the street in the ambient crowd, much less do so for more than half an hour, without realizing he wasn't listening to his own radio, or that he was effectively listening to two frequencies when he could scarcely hear one.

Counsel's suggestion that this was a likely solution to their dilemma constitute wishful thinking. Getting McLain to acknowledge such a possibility is at least shrewd and deceptive manipulation of an unsuspecting and obliging witness.

Why the motorcycle WAS at the Trade Mart:

Several three-wheel officers had traffic intersection assignments along the motorcade route as it approached the central business district. After the motorcade passed through those intersections and the traffic flow returned to normal, the officers reported to their next assignments. Some of them were to report directly to a motor pool detail at the Trade Mart, to arrive by 12:30 p.m. The motorcade cleared these early intersections between 12:20 and 12:24 p.m. At some locations, companion-officers remained to clear the last of the congestion, permitting the three-wheel officers to leave promptly. These three-wheel officers left, driving in normal traffic at normal speeds, generally, 30 MPH. The suspect motorcycle was running at this approximate speed for 6 to 8 minutes before it slowed to an idle. This time and speed would be correct to permit the three-wheel officers to travel the same approximate distances from those early assignments to the Trade Mart with perhaps a stop for a signal light or two for good measure. Incidentally, signal lights, if any, would have been encountered in the first minutes of the trip as there are virtually none along the routes farther out toward the Trade Mart. During the time period 12:24 to 12:29, the mike "opened" briefly 4 times. In the intervening time the motorcycle could have stopped a time or two without transmitting sound of the stop over the radio. The same time that the subject motorcycle engine slowed down was the same approximate time that the suspect motorcycle would have reached the Trade Mart. And at that time, the open mike picked up the first of several "cross-communications," events that would occur only when the motorcycle was conveniently near an operating speaker (sound source). The first "cross-talk" was the message, "I'll check it" at 12:32:02 (Channel 1). On Channel 2 at this same time, the message, "That's alright . . . I'll check it" was broadcast by a Deputy Chief to a Traffic Captain. The voice picked up on Channel 1 was that of the Deputy Chief. This Channel 2 message was picked up by the open mike on Channel 1 because the subject motorcycle was very near to the speaker of a radio monitoring Channel 2 traffic. This message became a transmission on Channel 1, and was recorded.

At approximately 12:33:01 (Channel 1) the motorcade sirens can be heard, faintly at first, increasing to full loudness. The siren source appears to pass, not as a single cluster, but as three separate groups. The siren episodes ended by fading out of hearing in the opposite manner of their arrival. The "siren episode" was some 33 seconds duration, and generated a distinct "Doppler Effect," which indicates that the sound source was passing the recording source rather than the opposite. This is a scientific fact which the Committee could have confirmed but didn't. NOTE: At that time there were no other emergency vehicles running singularly, and most certainly, no large groups, anywhere in the city. Accordingly, the siren source could only have been the motorcade and nothing else. Next: Where was the motorcade some two minutes after it left Dealey Plaza? Following its route, the distances measured in feet, and breaking the route into segments, then calculating the speeds of the motorcade in "feet per second," it can be demonstrated that the motorcade reached the intersection of Stemmons and Industrial at approximately 12:32:59 (Channel 1). Since the motorcade was the source of the "siren episode," and since the sirens were recorded passing the receiver at 12:32:59, where would practical thinkers expect the open mike to be? There can be no doubt. The motorcycle with the open mike was at the Trade Mart. It could NOT have been on an escort motorcycle either overtaking and passing or falling back. This is established by the COMPLETE ABSENCE of the sound of a siren or the attendant engine and wind noise of an escort unit.

At approximately 12:33:38 (Channel 1) the following message was recorded on Channel 1: "Attention all units; attention all units. . . . " That was NOT a Dallas Police broadcast. It was the Dallas County Sheriff's dispatcher. Referring to the Appendix, Channel 2, during the 12:32 time frame, Sheriff Decker told the Channel 2 dispatcher to contact the Sheriff's dispatcher and have him send ". . . all available . . ." to report to the assassination site. The "Attention all units . . ." is directly coincidental to the response to the sheriff's instructions by his dispatcher. The message was picked up and recorded on Channel 1 because the open mike was near to the outside speaker on a deputy sheriff's vehicle. The ONLY place where police officers and sheriff's deputies were working together in that manner was at the Trade Mart. The Texas Department of Public Safety used the same broadcast style, and they, too, had a unit at the Trade Mart Command Post. However, due to the time reference, it is more likely that it was the sheriff's dispatcher. That could have been confirmed by the Committee with a simple "Voice Print" of the operator and the recording. Even so, the Trade Mart was the only place where city and state units were working together.

At approximately 12:33:52 (Channel 1) the following message was recorded on Channel 1: "You want me to still hold this traffic on Stemmons until we find out something, or . . ." Referring to the Appendix, Channel 2, during the 12:34 time frame, Motorcycle Sergeant #190 asked, on Channel 2, the same question. At that time, he was still holding up northbound traffic on Stemmons, north of Elm Street. It was his actions which kept the freeway clear of private vehicles while Officer "H" was northbound from Continental on his three-wheel motorcycle. (See pages 44 and 86.) This message was picked up by the open mike being close to a Channel 2 speaker. Since this "cross-talk" was within seconds of the Sheriff's dispatcher's message, and considering that the subject motorcycle was not moving, it suggests that the motorcycle was sitting still at the Trade Mart command post or motor pool.

During the 12:34 (Channel 1) time frame the subject motorcycle seemed to move about briefly, and the movement apparently jarred the stuck transmitter switch causing it to release for about 6 seconds, and then it stuck open again until about 12:36 (Channel 1).

Just before 12:36 (Channel 1) the following message was recorded on Channel 1: ". . . came from the 5th floor . . . (Channel 1 dispatcher interrupts: '24 . . .') . . . of the Texas Depository Bookstore . . ." (sic). Referring to the Appendix, Channel 2, 12:36 time frame, Motorcycle Sergeant #260 made that broadcast. The broadcast was picked up by the open mike being close to a Channel 2 speaker.

By now, attention was being directed toward learning what had happened, why President Kennedy had not stopped when he passed the Trade Mart, why they went to the hospital. Also, the police dispatchers had broadcast that there was a three-wheel motorcycle in the area with its microphone stuck open. The officer using that motorcycle, in preparing to leave the Trade Mart en route to Parkland checked his mike as he started to leave and discovered that his was the offending microphone. The problem of the open mike was corrected at that time, and the officer arrived at Parkland a couple of minutes later. He is the same officer referred to in Chapter Three. Only the Committee could tell why they decided to say the motorcycle was in Dealey Plaza and would not consider why it was not.

The foregoing should provide adequate reasons for practical observers to understand that it was IMPOSSIBLE for the subject motorcycle to have been in the motorcade, much less a specific motorcycle, Officer McLain's, and to state its exact position in Dealey Plaza. Additionally, the foregoing should provide abundant reasons for practical observers to believe that the motorcycle was, in fact, at the Trade Mart, two and one-quarter miles from Dealey Plaza.

The deductions through which the Committee concluded that the subject motorcycle was McLain's in Dealey Plaza are based on impressive acoustical analyses, and we would suppose the Committee are sincere. The problem is, they are sincerely wrong.

FOURTH: Would the radio equipment have recorded audible sounds, had the open mike been in Dealey Plaza?

Yes, there would have been sounds of shots rather than "impressions," but ONLY IF the open mike was within 300 feet of the source, and IF ambient noise didn't cover the shots.

The Committee goes two ways on this point. They alternately refer to the "sound of shots," and they also state that the shot sounds are inaudible, that they are "impression patterns," but they did not define "impression patterns." And, more important, they did not say whether shots alone would have made the referenced impression patterns.

It is not necessary to argue acoustics as a science. To even attempt to do so, one would need professional qualifications at least equal if not superior to those who promulgated the acoustical evidence theory.

With reference to Chapter Four and an explanation of the technical properties of the police communications network, the system would have recorded the sounds of the shots (not inaudible impressions) had the shots been fired within 300 feet of the open microphone. The sound recorded would have been quite similar to that same sound if heard over regular telephone equipment.

In fact, during the series of test firings conducted by the select Committee in Dealey Plaza in August, 1978, similar radio equipment clearly received the sounds of all test shots and recorded them audibly, and easily recognizable, as shots.

The same would have applied to crowd noise. Had the open mike been in the motorcade, it would have clearly captured the noise of the crowd. Main Street is generally 50 feet wide, with sidewalks of 12 to 15 feet on either side of the street. The buildings are generally from three or four floors to 15 and 20 floors in height. People were massed along both sidewalks and overflowing into the street. They were clinging to posts and leaning out of windows. The motorcade passed through a canyon of loudly-cheering spectators, the walls of the buildings containing and echoing the sounds back into the arena of the street. The escort motorcycles were in the middle of all this. It is impossible that none of these noises are on the taped recordings . . . unless the open mike was elsewhere.

The recording of shot-sounds is not a new phenomenon. Police officers have heard shots and crowd noises over their radios for years. What else would one expect to hear?

FIFTH: Do time projections correctly relate to events?

Yes, those in this text do; those from the Committee do not. The Committee set the time of the assassins' shots as being fired at 12:30:47 through 12:30:55.3 (Channel 1) with the last shot being followed 7 seconds later by a single tone of a clarion-like bell. This is the only basis they offered by which one might establish where on the tape to find the 8.3 second shooting interval: by timing backward from the sound of the bell which sounded 7 seconds after the last (fourth) shot Unfortunately, they picked the WRONG time.

Had the last shot been fired at 12:30:55.3, and the bell-tone sounded 7 seconds later, the bell sound would have occurred at 12:31:03.3 (Channel 1). Actually, the bell-tone occurred more nearly at 12:31:20, or 16.7 seconds later then estimated by the Committee. While 16.7 seconds is but a brief period in the entire episode, it is more than ample time to constitute a fatal error to the Committee's work.

To afford the reader a basis for making an independent judgment, let's consider how the Committee apparently derived their time-basis. Since their Report does not specify their methodology clearly, it is necessary to extrapolate. The reader can then decide which time-basis is the more accurate.

With reference to the Channel 1 transcript, (See Appendix, Channel 1, 12:28), the officer working district #83 checked out of service to handle a traffic situation. The dispatcher acknowledged, "Eighty-three out, 12:28." A stopwatch started at the instant the dispatcher gave the time-statement as 12:28, and allowed to run until the sound of the bell-tone occurred would run for 3 minutes, 3.6 seconds, or until 12:31:03.6, or within .3 second of the Committee's statement as to the time the bell-tone occurred. Apparently, the Committee made the mistake of assuming that the first time the dispatcher stated the time as "12:28" was the exact instant that it became 12:28 p.m. This would build in an incorrect time reference. They failed to consider several points:

* There were 21 seconds of radio time used from the last "12:27" to the first "12:28" statement. How much of that 21 seconds should be credited to the end of the 27th minute, and how much to the start of the 28th minute?

* The message that #83 was out of service on a traffic check, and the dispatcher's acknowledgment took 3.5 seconds, and they appear to have been arbitrarily allocated to the 12:27 time frame. They could have been during the 12:28 time frame.

* The Committee erroneously determined that the Channel 1 recorder ran continuously. It did NOT. It recorded intermittently. No recognition was given to any time-break in the transmissions between the call to the officer working #56 (12:27) and the dispatcher's next message. Likewise, the Committee's position assumes that #38's message and the dispatcher's acknowledgment followed instantly after the episode when the mike opened for 17.5 seconds.

Since it is impossible to guarantee the exactness of anyone's time estimates, some basis must be stipulated. What must be considered in making such a stipulation? There was quite a bit of radio use prior to the five-plus minutes that the mike remained open:

* From the first "12:27" to the first "12:28" there was 37 seconds of radio use.

* From the first "12:28" until the last "12:28" (12:29 was never stated), there was 55 seconds of radio use. Since the radio cannot be used more than 60 seconds per minute, and might be used "zero" seconds, it is necessary to use a little logic based on ordinary use patterns and the specific message patterns at the time. Allowing for 12:28 real-time to have occurred a few seconds before the first time the dispatcher stated the time, and allowing a couple of seconds between #83's and #56's messages, and a few seconds between the "open mike" episode and #38's message and the dispatcher's responses, 12:29 real-time occurred shortly before the five-minute "open mike" episode. Accordingly, this text considers that the major open mike episode started at 12:29:10 p.m., Channel 1 time.

Since there is no factual proof, what empirical proof would support the 12:29:10 estimate?

* While the motorcycle microphone was still open, #103 cleared from his previous assignment, and the dispatcher acknowledged him at 12:34. Projecting 12:29:10 through the open mike episode, that acknowledgment occurred at 12:33:59, or within one second of the adjusted time.

* Next, #76 cleared and was acknowledged at 12:34. This "time" coincides with 12:34:00 and 12:34:07, with the acknowledgment coming at 12:34:09.

* The open mike closed shortly after 12:34: 18 and remained closed for about 51 seconds, breaking the "real-time" effect of the recorder, putting the recorder a little behind real-time. The next "time" reference occurred when the dispatcher dispatched a call to #35 at 12:35 p.m. This coincides with 12:34:46, which is as it should be, the dispatcher's time being a little ahead of the projected time.

Should one start the preceding times 16.7 seconds later, the subsequent times would not have occurred so accurately.

As stated previously, the two dispatchers were some 15 seconds out of synchronization in their announced "time" statements, with Channel 2 being ahead of Channel 1. The time estimates offered in this text agree with that position. To confirm the accuracy of this projection, consider the time the simultaneous broadcast, and those times when Channel 2 broadcasts were picked up by the open microphone being parked near a Channel 2 speaker. (See Appendix, Channels 1 and 2 at times indicated below.)

* Early in the 12:36 (Channel 2) time frame, (12:35:58 to 12:36:06) the Channel 2 dispatcher broadcast simultaneously on both channels. By continuing the stopwatch on the Channel 1 recording (as if a real-time recorder) the simultaneous broadcast occurred at least during or after 12:35:46 (Channel 1), or from 12:35:38 to 12:35:46, some 20 seconds difference.

* At approximately 12:31:04 (Channel 2), the message ". . . I'll check it" corresponds with 12:31:02 (Channel 1), a difference of some 2 seconds.

* At approximately 12:34:16 (Channel 2), the message "You want me to hold . . ." corresponds with 12:33:52 (Channel 1), a difference of some 24 seconds.

* At approximately 12:36:21 (Channel 2), the message ". . . came from the 5th floor . . ." corresponds with 12:35:57 (Channel 1, a difference of 24 seconds.

Based on these time constructions and comparisons, this text postulates that the principal open mike episode began at 12:29:10 and continued until 12:34:19 (Channel 1), and that Channel 2 announced times were a little ahead of Channel 1 times, which is close to the 15-second allowable. Further, that the time projections in this text relate more correctly to events than does the time reference established by the Committee.

SIXTH: Can events be established accurately?

Yes. Times and motions occurred within specific and identifiable limitations. Although the time references are dependent on accurate projections, those events can be reasonably synchronized. In so doing, it must be remembered that some activity could not occur at or within certain time points or periods. For example, it was impossible for Officer McLain to have left Dealey Plaza at a time different than that which he has stated. It would have been impossible for a motorcycle to have caught the motorcade almost two minutes after the motorcade left Dealey Plaza, if the second motorcycle was more than a few seconds late in leaving. Officers "G" and "H" related their experiences and recollections, totally unaware of how they would fit with and confirm other, and independent variables. The arrival times at Stemmons and Continental, at Stemmons and Industrial, and at Parkland Hospital fit time and distance references perfectly.

It simply is not sufficient to declare something to be factual because it is necessary to support an existing theory. Such things must be developed within the limits of fact where facts are available, and within the limits of reasoning where facts are absent.

SEVENTH: Does reconstruction enhance theory in the absence of proof?

This question calls for a judgment answer. There are two approaches to a "Reconstruction Theory," Actual and Conceptual.

Actual reconstruction has established the time and speed of the motorcade into and through the central business district, and its time of arrival in Dealey Plaza.

Actual reconstruction has demonstrated that the motorcade arrived at and passed the Trade Mart at the same time the sounds of sirens appeared on the Channel 1 recording. Additionally, a motorcycle leaving Dealey Plaza a couple of seconds after the motorcade's departure could not have overtaken the motorcade in the two-minute period before the sounds of sirens appeared on the tape.

Actual reconstruction independently determined that Officer "G" precluded Officer McLain leaving as late as the Committee suggested in an effort to explain the total absence of crucial sounds which would have necessarily been recorded. Further, that Officer "H" arrived at Stemmons and Continental when he did confirms both the presence of the motorcade there at 12:31:43 (Channel 1), and that no other vehicles, McLain specifically, joined the motorcade beyond that point and the Trade Mart.

Conceptual reconstruction has fixed the element of time for both radio channels with the conclusion that Channel 2 was about 15 seconds ahead of Channel 1. Further, that, while the shots were fired in the late 12:30 (Channel 1) time frame, the area of the tape determined by the Committee to be the place where the assassins' shots were found is actually 16 seconds-plus too early. Had the shots been fired when the Committee concluded, President Kennedy would have still been on Houston Street, not yet turned onto Elm.

Conceptual reconstruction indicated that the nature and distribution of the crowd in the downtown street, and their proximity to the motorcycle officers, and the rate of speed of the motorcade confirm that, had the subject motorcycle been in the motorcade, the crowd noise would have been recorded.

Conceptual reconstruction indicates that it would have been unlikely that a motorcycle officer could have monitored both radio channels or the wrong one for almost thirty minutes without realizing his error, and that it would have been impossible for him to have heard the orders to go to the hospital over another officer's radio from a distance of 100 feet or more in such noise.

Actual and conceptual reconstruction has demonstrated that experienced officers were in positions from which they could accurately observe, and that they do state without equivocation that only three shots were fired, and that they were fired from, or from the direction of the Texas School Book Depository, and that no shots were fired from the area called the grassy knoll.

Actual reconstruction of events of the day revealed the identity of the three-wheel officer who experienced the problem of the open mike, and it was not Officer McLain. It was a motorcycle en route to, and at the Trade Mart.


Now the questions are passed on to the reasoning of the individual reader: Does the reconstruction of time and events indicate that the motorcycle with the open microphone was not in Dealey Plaza? Was the subject motorcycle at the Trade Mart?

Since the questions cannot be answered absolutely through a complete set of facts, the answers can only come through reasoning.

The Committee Report acknowledged that the acoustical evidence was wholly dependent upon

1. The open mike being on McLain's motorcycle, and

2. McLain's motorcycle being at one exact point at the time the shooting started, and

3. That it moved at an exact speed to an exact point at the time the last shot was fired.

Further, the Committee claimed that there was supporting and corroborating details which validate the acoustical evidence.

Is there any acoustical evidence? Had the Committee truly proved anything?

Answers and opinion should not be force-fed under the color of scientific research. Too many research techniques were ignored. Too many research principals were violated. Too many questions received poor answers, incorrect answers, or worse, no answers at all even though they could have and should have.

Do the following questions relate to the issues surrounding the Channel 1 recordings? Should they have been answered? Have they been answered? Are the answers and/or conclusions valid or reasonable? Whose conclusions are most representative of the truth? What should history say?

* Could a motorcycle running near 30 MPH for more than 4 minutes be part of a motorcade traveling less than 10 MPH? This text says no.

* Could on ordinary officer listen to the wrong radio for half an hour and not know? This text and the officer say no.

* Could an officer hear and respond to a radio 100 feet away and not know it, and not be able to hear his partner yelling at him from a distance of 5 feet? This text and the officer say no.

* Could the open mike, which must have been in an exact position, and in motion, have recorded the "sound impressions" when actually, the motorcycle was stopped or stopping about 100 feet from the essential position? This text says no.

* Would a professional-level investigation test to determine the correct kind of motorcycle (two or three-wheel) and its correct rate of speed when the exact answers to both are crucial to conclusions? This text says yes . . . and wonders why it didn't.

* Would a professional, open and objective investigation neglect or ignore the testimony of experienced officers with significant information? This text says no.

* Did the officers in the motorcade (except McLain) hear three shots, and no more? . . . This text and the officers say yes.

* Did those officers who were in a position to do so, effectively rule out a shot from the grassy knoll? This text and the officers say yes.

* With one known exception, those bystanders who thought the shots came from the grassy knoll thought all three did. However, the Committee concluded that, while these witnesses' testimony was reliable enough to launch the search to confirm one shot from the grassy knoll, they were not sufficiently reliable for the Committee to accept their word for three or even four shots . . . This text believes that those few bystanders did hear three shot sounds, but that these were echoes or the three shots from the School Book Depository. This text also believes that to materially alter their testimony will compromise their entire testimony. The Committee selectively used that which complemented the Committee's position, and, without explanation, dismissed that which didn't.

* Did the motorcade leave Dealey Plaza in one loosely organized group en route to the hospital? This text says yes.

* Did Officers "G" and "H" effectively close the door on other vehicles joining the motorcade from its rear? This text says yes.

* Did the motorcade generate the 33 second interval of siren sounds on Channel 1, and was the motorcade passing the Trade Mart at that time? This text says yes.

* Did the motorcade reach the hospital at the time, and with the composition as in the reconstruction? This text says yes.

* Does the reconstruction of three wheel officers en route to the Trade Mart from traffic assignments demonstrate the time and speed correctly, and does the sound of the engine at idle reasonably suggest the motorcycle to be at the Trade Mart rather than in the motorcade? This text says yes.

* Does the three-wheel officer at the Trade Mart, who had the problem with an open mike, shed light on whose mike was open, and where? This text says yes.

* Does the fact that the motorcade sirens are recorded in three separate groups, with the Doppler Effect present, indicate that the sirens were passing the vehicle with the open mike? This text says yes. The Committee vigorously denied this. However, their subsequent Report acknowledges that this is true. (Appendix to Hearings, Volume VII, Chapter 6, paragraph 6.2, page 112.)

* Since the radio network had, in the past, transmitted and recorded the sounds of shots and of crowds, shouldn't they have been recorded on Channel 1 in this event? This text says yes.

* Does the Committee's inaccuracy in simple facts, such as whether Channel 1 was served by a continuous recorder, the frequency range of the equipment, and the kind of microphones used, suggest a complete, competent, unbiased, professional investigation? Or does it suggest a hasty means to justify a preconceived end? This text suggests the latter.

* Does the Committee effectively explain away the legitimate challenges? Such as other mikes which conveniently stuck open when necessary . . . That an officer elsewhere happened to open his mike, record the "bell-tone," then close his mike without saying a word . . . That McLain "forgot to turn on" his siren . . . That an engine running 30 MPH is the same as one in the motorcade traveling 5 to 10 MPH . . . That an idling engine is the same as one racing along the freeway in pursuit of the motorcade . . . That siren sounds disappeared because the motorcade reached the hospital, 3 1/3 miles distance in less than 2 minutes . . . That everyone who "witnessed" to the Committee's satisfaction was a valuable, bona fide witness with valid information, but those who were true witnesses, but who contradicted the Committee's theories, were unworthy, unreliable, and unmentioned.

How far should rebuttal go? How much rebuttal is necessary? How valid is the Committee Report? How valid is the rebuttal?

This text has attempted to reconstruct time, the events and recollections for that interval of November 22, 1963, through a Reconstruction-Progression Theory. In that manner the text identifies and utilizes facts neglected by Committee investigators, and connects loose ends, permitting rational reasoning to inform one, in the absence of fact. The reader is afforded alternatives, but is not led to believe anything.

In fact, is it important for the assassination to be revisited so frequently? So much has been theorized and so much has been written, that it is increasingly more difficult to separate fact from fantasy and fiction.

Whether the Warren Commission were impressive in the manner in which they reached their conclusions, they nevertheless appear to have reached the right conclusions.

Whether it was a thorough and brilliant delving into and sorting out of endless files of data, reaching an accurate resolution of facts, or whether it was pure luck, the commission concluded that there were three shots and only three shots fired at President Kennedy, that all three shots were fired by Lee Harvey Oswald shooting from the School Book Depository, that Jack Ruby killed Oswald, and that each acted alone for reasons known only to them.

No one knows whether this is the full and absolute truth. If there was a conspiracy, it certainly must rank as history's best-kept secret. Scores of serious and capable official as well as independent researchers have spent years going over assassination information, and have brought out previously unknown information, but still reach the same conclusion. Others have concocted theories ranging from intriguing to idiotic. If there was an unanswered question, it remains unanswered.

Consider the nature of a secret and the reliability of people for keeping them, and then consider how many people would have been involved in a conspiracy and for how many years. Anyone having even partial knowledge of a conspiracy could claim instant wealth and lasting world fame by divulging such information. Still, nothing has been revealed.

The sum total of the Select Committee's conclusion is an irresponsible estimate of the possibility of a conspiracy, based on an unprofessional and incompetent hoax.

An unfortunate by-product of the Committee's conclusion is an alibi. The Committee majority declared that, to an almost-certainty a shot was fired by a second assassin from a position on the grassy knoll. Should someone eventually be discovered through competent evidence to have been a second assassin, and that his shot was fired from almost any position OTHER than the grassy knoll, prosecution would be virtually impossible. That second assassin could use the Committee's Report to slam-shut the door on all shooters from all locations other than one from the grassy knoll. That assassin has a 5.8 million dollar defense furnished him by the Committee, at the expense of the American taxpayer. The Select Committee had far more opportunity, time and money than did the Warren Commission, and achieved nothing.

It is unthinkable that learned and trusted employees of the people, and members of our law enforcement and legal profession would lend dignity to such a preposterous deception as that of the expert acoustical evidence.

This writer has no special or privileged information with regard to whether Lee Harvey Oswald killed President Kennedy, or if he did, whether he acted alone, or whether there was a tangible connection between Oswald and Jack Leon Ruby or anyone else.

There is an important fact which should be remembered: The murder of President Kennedy and the assault on Governor Connally were offenses against the laws of the citizens of Texas. There is no statute of limitation on murder in Texas. It would be proper for people, however skilled and well-intentioned, to think and to speak carefully lest they contaminate evidence and obstruct justice in the event justice has not yet been done.


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